In early May 2025, the U.S. Navy suffered a second fighter-jet mishap in the Red Sea involving the USS Harry S. Truman carrier. On May 6, 2025, an F/A-18F Super Hornet (a two-seat variant) failed to catch the arresting cable during a nighttime landing and slid off the deck into the sea. Both aviators – the pilot and weapons systems officer – ejected safely and were recovered with minor injuries. This crash came just days after another Super Hornet (an F/A-18E) was lost overboard on April 28. These accidents follow earlier incidents (a friendly-fire shootdown in December 2024 and a collision in February), raising questions about carrier operations and readiness in the tense Red Sea combat zone. Below is a detailed account of the timeline, aircraft and crew involved, possible causes, official reactions, and the broader strategic implications.
Timeline of Incidents
- Dec 22, 2024 – Friendly-fire shootdown: A two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet from the Truman (attached to VFA-11 “Red Rippers”) was mistakenly shot down by the guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg over the Red Sea. The jet had just launched from Truman when it was engaged. Both pilots ejected and were rescued; one suffered minor injuries. This “friendly fire” incident underscored the dangers of intense carrier operations in the Red Sea corridor.
- February 2025 – Collision at sea: The Truman collided with a large merchant vessel near Port Said, Egypt. Although not a flight mishap, this crash prompted the Navy to relieve the carrier’s commanding officer. It highlighted strain on the crew during a prolonged deployment.
- April 28, 2025 – First Super Hornet mishap: An F/A-18E Super Hornet (single-seat) assigned to VFA-136 tumbled off the Truman and into the Red Sea while being towed in the hangar bay. A Navy press release reported that the move crew “lost control of the aircraft,” causing both the jet and its tow tractor to go overboard. One sailor was slightly injured; all personnel were accounted for and the carrier strike group remained “fully mission capable”. Initial reports linked this loss to a sharp maneuver by the Truman to evade incoming Houthi fire, but the Navy attributed it to the towing accident.
- May 6, 2025 – Second Super Hornet mishap: During a night landing attempt off the Truman, an F/A-18F Super Hornet suffered an apparent arresting-gear failure. The pilots failed to stop in time and the jet slid off the carrier’s starboard side into the sea. Both crewmen ejected safely from their aircraft. They were picked up by a Navy rescue helicopter and were treated for minor injuries. The Super Hornet plunged into the Red Sea and has not been recovered. U.S. officials noted that Iranian-backed Houthi rebels had simultaneously fired rockets at the Truman, though it’s unclear if that attack affected flight operations.
Each date above marks a major event in the Truman’s recent deployment. All the mishaps occurred while the carrier was supporting naval operations in the Red Sea area of responsibility.
The second incident occurred during a night-landing attempt on Harry S. Truman’s deck. The two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornet (like the one pictured) failed to catch the arresting cable and slid off the carrier. Both aviators ejected safely. This photo shows a Super Hornet conducting a touch-and-go landing on a Nimitz-class carrier deck. (Image: U.S. Navy/Public Domain)
The Second Mishap in Detail
The May 6 mishap involved an F/A-18F Super Hornet (tail number 106) during routine night operations. According to multiple sources, the jet “suffered some sort of arrestment failure” as it came aboard. In carrier aviation, arresting gear on the deck must catch the aircraft’s tailhook to rapidly decelerate it. An “arrestment failure” implies the cable did not catch or slowed too late. Video and sensor data will be analyzed by investigators to confirm exactly what happened.
At 8:45 p.m. local time, the jet approached the Truman and landed on deck, but was unable to halt. The pilots realized they would slide off the stern, and both ejected from the moving aircraft just seconds later. A rescue helicopter (an HH-60 Seahawk) on standby immediately recovered both airmen. U.S. officials say the aviators, whose names have not been released, only suffered minor injuries (bruises and scrapes) and were taken to a hospital ship for observation. The flight deck and ship were not damaged, and no other crew members were hurt. The Navy reports that none of the jet’s weapons were loaded at the time, mitigating the risk when it sank into the sea.
With the pilots safe, the downed jet remains in the water. Attempts to retrieve it are difficult in the depth and currents of the Red Sea, so it is likely a total loss. The Navy has called in salvage assets (including divers and remotely operated vehicles) to see if any wreckage can be recovered for the investigation, but priority is on flight operations rather than retrieval.
Aircraft and Crew
The F/A-18F Super Hornet is a twin-engine, carrier-capable multirole fighter. The F-model is a two-seat variant (pilot plus weapons systems officer), equipped with advanced avionics, radars, and can carry air-to-air missiles, bombs, and targeting pods. Its single-seat cousin, the F/A-18E, served as the jet in the April 28 mishap. Both models have been frontline Navy fighters for decades. Each Super Hornet cost is roughly $60–70 million; for example, the April 28 F/A-18E was valued at about $67.4 million. The jets are built by Boeing (formerly McDonnell Douglas) and remain the Navy’s principal strike fighters.
In the May 6 accident, the two aviators ejected unharmed. In contrast, the April 28 loss happened while the jet was being towed in the hangar (it was not flying), so only deck crew were aboard. That incident injured one sailor who was moving the aircraft. In all these events, no flight crew fatalities have occurred. The carrier strike group includes roughly 60 Super Hornets in its embarked air wing, so losing one or two to accidents does not immediately degrade the carrier’s overall firepower. However, each aircraft lost is a multi-million-dollar asset, and replacement jets have to be flown from shore bases, straining logistics.
Prior Incidents This Year
The Harry S. Truman’s deployment has been marred by several major incidents even before early May:
- April 28, 2025: An F/A-18E Super Hornet fell off the Truman while under tow in the hangar bay. The Navy later clarified that sailors simply “lost control of the aircraft” during towing. Initially, some officials had suggested that a sharp ship maneuver to dodge Houthi fire contributed to the jet going overboard, but the official report cited a towing mishap.
- Dec 22, 2024: A two-seat F/A-18F (from VFA-11) was mistakenly shot down by the guided-missile cruiser USS Gettysburg. The Hornet had just launched from Truman, and Gettysburg’s crew (part of the same strike group) identified it as a hostile target in the heat of battle. Both pilots ejected safely; one later reported concussion-like symptoms but survived.
- February 2025: The Truman collided with a merchant ship during routine navigation in the Mediterranean. No aircraft were involved, but the incident led to the removal of the carrier’s commanding officer.
- Other Mishaps: The Truman’s strike group has also dealt with close calls from Houthi drone and missile attacks on other ships, and several ships (including destroyers) in the region have had to use defensive weapons (like CIWS and SM-6 missiles) to intercept threats.
Taken together, losing three separate fighter jets on one deployment (plus the collision) is unusual. U.S. Navy aircraft and crews generally have strong safety records. Industry analysts note that this series of losses on the Truman is unprecedented in recent history. It suggests a combination of tough operating conditions and perhaps systemic strain on the crew and hardware.
Possible Causes
The investigation is ongoing, but several factors are under consideration:
- Mechanical/Equipment Failure: In the May 6 crash, “arrestment failure” implies a failure in the arresting gear or tailhook. Possible faults include a broken wire in the cable, a malfunctioning hydraulic damping system (engine), or the tailhook failing to engage. The Navy will examine maintenance logs for the cable and arresting engines to see if any parts were due for replacement. Modern carriers use redundant safety systems, but no system is infallible.
- Human/Procedural Error: Carrier landings, especially at night, are high-stress. Pilots must judge distance and speed precisely. Controllers on the deck coordinate the cable drop. Investigators will check whether the aircraft approach speed or hook placement were correct. Similarly, the April 28 event involved human error: according to the Navy, the deck crew “lost control” of the tractor-towed aircraft. They are reviewing whether parking brakes, chocks, or tow-bar procedures were properly applied.
- Environmental Factors: The Red Sea is typically calm in May, but wind and sea state can still affect deck operations. No reports suggest a sudden squall on May 6. However, nighttime lighting and optical illusions over water can challenge pilots. The Secretary of the Navy may consider restricting high-risk operations in marginal weather, if any contributed.
- Hostile Threats: Some accounts linked the first mishap to evasive maneuvers. In April, a U.S. official told The Washington Post that the Truman made a “hard turn” to dodge incoming fire when the Hornet went overboard. If the ship was streaming a tow or settling in heavy roll, that could have caused the aircraft to slip. In May, Reuters and CNN noted that Houthi rebels fired rockets at the carrier on the same night, but they did not hit the ship. It’s unclear if crew attention was diverted by the threat. For now, no evidence points to enemy action causing the second crash.
- Cumulative Strain: Analysts suggest that the Truman has been operating at high tempo for months. Fatigue can degrade performance. If maintenance crews are working extended hours, and pilots have flown combat sorties on top of training sorties, the chance of errors rises. The Navy is reportedly assessing crew rest schedules to rule out fatigue as a contributing factor.
In summary, there is no single obvious cause yet. The two accidents seem unrelated: one involved a tow tractor, the other a deck landing. The Navy will likely convene a formal aircraft accident board to determine root causes, which may not be released publicly for months.
Official Responses
The Navy and Pentagon have issued measured statements. For the April 28 mishap, the Truman strike group released a press statement: “USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) lost an F/A-18E Super Hornet… All personnel are accounted for, with one Sailor sustaining a minor injury.” The statement assured that “an investigation is underway” and emphasized that the carrier group remained “fully mission capable.” This was echoed by The Washington Post, which noted the Navy’s words and a separate U.S. official confirming the ship had made an evasive maneuver.
Regarding the May 6 crash, the Pentagon deferred questions to the Navy. A Navy spokesperson told The Washington Post that the aircraft “went overboard after an unsuccessful attempt to slow it down upon landing on the USS Harry S. Truman,” and confirmed that both aviators ejected and were recovered. No additional details (such as pilot names or technical findings) have been released. The Navy press corps reported that “no one aboard the flight deck was harmed”. The Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasized that operations continued normally.
The Defense Department has otherwise focused on the mission in Yemen. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, in a statement this week, highlighted the need to keep two carriers in the region to deter Houthi attacks. He has not publicly addressed the mishaps specifically. A senior U.S. defense official told The Washington Post (on condition of anonymity) that “the mishaps have the attention of senior leaders”. U.S. Central Command and NATO allies, involved in Red Sea security, have offered aid and condolences but are awaiting the Navy’s full reports.
Admiral Dan Cheever, the Navy’s aviation boss, has underlined a culture of rapid learning. At a Jan 2025 briefing about the Red Sea campaign, he said the Navy was conducting “multiple different investigations to make sure we learn” from its own incidents, including the friendly-fire shootdownCheever vowed that investigations “don’t stop us at the tactical level from learning everything and training and changing our training to make sure that never happens again” This suggests the Navy will quickly incorporate any lessons (for example, on carrier-landing procedures or communication protocols) even before formal reports conclude.
Regional Context and Implications
These carrier mishaps come amid one of the most complex maritime security crises in decades. Since late 2023, Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels have waged a relentless campaign against shipping in the Red Sea, in solidarity with Gaza. In response, the U.S. and allies launched Operation Prosperity Guardian (led by the U.S.) and an EU mission (Aspides) to protect merchant ships. U.S. warships, including carrier strike groups, have been on constant patrol, conducting air strikes on Houthi targets and escorting convoys. The Truman has been at the center of this effort, launching sorties and providing air cover.
Despite this deterrent presence, the cost has been high. The Houthi campaign has significantly disrupted global trade. One analysis notes that Red Sea shipping traffic is down by over 50% compared to a year earlier. Suez Canal transits plunged from over 2,000 per month to under 1,000. Regional ports face congestion as vessels reroute or await transit. The Truman’s operational tempo – combat air strikes by day and flight operations by night – reflects the intensity of this theater.
In this climate, even non-combat losses have strategic repercussions. Defense experts emphasize that modern carriers are not easily replaced: each is a billion-dollar capital asset supporting hundreds of aircraft. Repeated mishaps, even with no loss of life, can affect morale and lead to operational pauses or retraining. According to a military insider at the Naval War College, “The accident rate is still low compared to thousands of sorties flown, but the clustering of incidents on one ship is a warning sign.” Naval analysts say Washington will scrutinize whether these events were inevitable byproducts of warlike operations or avoidable.
On the policy side, the Trump Administration has doubled down on pressure against the Houthis, including stepped-up air strikes and arming of regional allies. Continuation of attacks on commercial shipping has justified keeping carriers in the area. However, these mishaps may factor into discussions over risk and readiness. The Navy’s forward deployments are under Congressional oversight; any sign of systemic issues could provoke hearings or calls for increased funding or training.
Expert Take: Military analysts note the resilience of U.S. naval forces. One commentator wrote that “the Red Sea campaign has been a technical triumph of Aegis and counter-drone operations” but cautioned that “for sailors, this is a grueling deployment.” The series of mishaps on Truman underscores that even a powerful carrier can suffer breakdowns when pushed hard. As one retired pilot tweeted, “Great ship, great crew – now we have to get them a bit of rest and tighten up the wire.”
Training and Readiness
In response to these events, Navy leadership is reiterating safety and readiness measures. The official message remains that the strike group is mission-capable. Yet internally, crews have been debriefing intensively. Flight-deck teams are reportedly conducting extra checks of arresting cables, engines, and restraints between landings. Aviators are reviewing carrier approach procedures. The Navy may also limit operations in marginal weather or adjust sortie schedules to ensure pilots are fully rested.
Carrier flight operations already follow rigorous protocols. The recent losses may prompt a temporary “tiger cruise” style review of every step: from tow-tractor procedures (after April’s loss) to the timing of touch-down calls (after May’s crash). The Navy’s famed all-encompassing safety ethos – often phrased as “Get Real, Get Better” – means that mistakes are studied fleet-wide. During the January aviation conference, Adm. Cheever emphasized “rapid learning” from even one incident. It is likely that lessons from these mishaps will be incorporated into updated training syllabi for squadrons and deck crews.
On a broader scale, the Navy continues to maintain two carrier strike groups in the Middle East area, a step Secretary Hegseth says is needed to deal with the Houthi threat. Other U.S. forces in the region (destroyers, amphibious groups) are also providing overlapping coverage. If for any reason the Truman needed maintenance or relief, another carrier (such as USS Dwight D. Eisenhower) could arrive. For now, however, the Navy is keeping Truman on station.
Safety Protocol Updates: No new official-wide mandates have been released yet. However, after the December friendly-fire shootdown, U.S. Naval Air Forces accelerated cross-deck communication drills to prevent misidentification. After this week’s events, similar refreshers on deck-safety checks are likely. A Navy spokesperson told reporters that training is being re-emphasized “to make sure nothing like this happens again”. Analysts note that Nimitz-class carriers operate as floating airfields 24/7; human factors and equipment wear are constant concerns. The ongoing investigations will likely yield recommendations on maintenance intervals for arresting gear and towing equipment, as well as review of flight-deck emergency procedures.
In summary, the Truman strike group remains in action, but with heightened vigilance. The Navy aims to extract lessons quickly, balancing the imperative of the mission with the need to safeguard its people and jets.
Sources: Official Navy press releases and U.S. defense officials (via CNN, ABC News, and Washington Post reporting); Pentagon statements; defense analysis (Washington Institute); and military press.
